# A Modular, User-Centric Security Analysis of OpenStack

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# Outlines

- Introduction
  - Cloud Computing
  - OpenStack
  - Universal Composability
- Universal Composability
- Analysis Approach
- Conclusion


## Infrastructure

#### Challenges


- Deploying new applications
- Running multiple applications
- Scaling up/down the share of each application
- Different security requirements
- Protecting against the vulnerabilities of the other applications
- ...

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








## **Cloud Computing**



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## **Cloud Security Issues**

- Cloud Platform
  - Huge software
  - Many bugs
- Cloud serves several different applications
  - Isolation
  - Shared underling hardware; Side channel attacks
  - Buggy code
- Cloud serves many people
  - Attackers, Hackers
  - Privacy, Confidentiality



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# OpenStack

### •Reliable Open Source Cloud Platform


- •Widely Used
  - 71% of clouds in production or full operational use
- •Infrastructure as a Service (laaS)

#### •Highly Modular

- 23 main modules
- Many plug-ins
- •Community based development Model
  - More than 6500 contributors

### Rapidly growing

• 6-month cycles



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## Main Services



## **Optional Services**



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## **OpenStack Security Issues**

- Cloud issues
- Difficulty of security analysis
  - More than 3.5 million lines of code
  - More than 6,500 contributors
- Lack of clear security model
- Not well defined APIs
- Lots of plug ins
  - VMM: KVM, XEN, Hyper-V, VMware



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## Solution?

## **Universal Composability**

## Universal Composability

- General-purpose model for security analysis of protocols
- Perfect for modular systems
- Common understanding and common language
- Introduced by Ran Canetti in 2000

## UCONN Universal Composability-Overview

- Secure protocols remain secure
- Security proof based on emulation
- A protocol emulates another one,
  - if no environment (observer) can distinguish the executions
  - P1 ≈ P2

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## Universal Composability Analysis of OpenStack

### Goals

- Better understanding of OpenStack's security guarantees (for OpenStack Users/Customers)
- Assist in identifying highest-impact security improvements (for OpenStack Developers)
- Formal definition of OpenStack security-related functionality (for Cryptographers)
- Study the security interfaces between components which has not been studied well

#### Steps

- Define Functionality of Ideal Cloud
- Define Functionality of Ideal Components
- Show that Components realize the Ideal Cloud Functionality
- Propose OpenStack Modifications to realize the Functionalities
- Propose Component Implementations that realize the Functionalities

# Ideal World


### Ideal OpenStack

- Accurate
- No time

### **Ideal Functionalities:**


- Create Node
- Delete Node
- Upload Image
- Delete Image
- Create Volume
- • •

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
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
## Hybrid World




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## Security Analysis





## Security Analysis



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
## Next Steps





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## Security Analysis







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# Conclusion

- OpenStack security must be analyzed
  - The security model depends on the plug-in set
- UC
  - Better understanding of cloud security model
  - Reveals security bottlenecks and concerns
  - Allows understanding to how to improve the security posture
- Needs Time and Expertise

#### A Modular, User-Centric Security Analysis of OpenStack

#### Challenge:

- Cloud computing has a huge impact on society, but security concerns inhibit its uptake
- OpenStack is the prevalent open-source, non-proprietary package for managing cloud services and data centers
- Provide rigorous and holistic security analysis of OpenStack in the universally composable (UC) security framework

#### Solution:

- Analyze OpenStack's multiple inter-related components
- Assert the security of components individually
- Then compose to derive the overall system's security



Applications & platforms	
Operating system	-
Cloud IaaS management	
Hardware	-

Participating institutions: Boston University (NSF grant 1414119, "Modular Approach to Cloud Security), MIT (1413920], Northeastern (1413964), and UConn (1413996). For more info, email marten.van\_dijk@uconn.edu.

#### Scientific Impact:

- User-Centric: Stresses the security guarantees given to users of the system
- Modular: Formulates security properties for individual components and deduces from these security properties of the overall service
- Defense in Depth: OpenStack can be improved, with minimal changes

#### Broader Impact:

- Showcase composable design and analysis as a viable basis for secure system design
- Impact upon the practice of cloud computing (collaboration Massachusetts Open Cloud)
- Several outreach programs to expose local-area middle and high school students and their teachers to cybersecurity



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## Thank You !

Lab's website: <u>http://scl.uconn.edu</u>

Other research: HW Trojans, Secure Supply Chain Management, Moving Target Defense, Secure Processor Architectures, Oblivious RAM, FHE, ... and wherever my students take me

**Picture References:** 

- http://sthelenslscb.org.uk
- http://www.dell.com
- https://www.openstack.org